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Abstract
Relationships we have with our friends, family, or colleagues influence our personal decisions, as well as decisions we make
together with others. As in human beings, despotism and egalitarian societies seem to also exist in animals. While studies
have shown that social networks constrain many phenomena from amoebae to primates, we still do not know how
consensus emerges from the properties of social networks in many biological systems. We created artificial social networks
that represent the continuum from centralized to decentralized organization and used an agent-based model to make
predictions about the patterns of consensus and collective movements we observed according to the social network. These
theoretical results showed that different social networks and especially contrasted ones – star network vs. equal network -
led to totally different patterns. Our model showed that, by moving from a centralized network to a decentralized one, the
central individual seemed to lose its leadership in the collective movement’s decisions. We, therefore, showed a link
between the type of social network and the resulting consensus. By comparing our theoretical data with data on five
groups of primates, we confirmed that this relationship between social network and consensus also appears to exist in
animal societies.
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Introduction
Every day humans make decisions. Any decision made by an
individual is influenced by the relationships he or she has with
people in different circumstances. For example, the head of a firm,
or the parents in a family, may exert greater influence in the
decision-making process than other contributors do. For a
presidential election, people generally decide individually which
candidate they will vote for, even if friends and family may
influence their decision to a certain extent. Broadly speaking, two
systems of decision-making are often described: on the one hand,
one individual, or one sub-group, decides for the rest of the group
(unshared consensus, [1]); on the other hand, each individual can
make independent decisions and take an equal part in the vote
(shared consensus, [1]). This study aimed to understand how the
social network – the structure of social relationships between the
members of a group - may affect the influence of these individuals
on collective decision-making and thus lead to unshared or shared
consensus [1–4].
Consensus decision-making in animal groups has already been
described by several authors (for a review, see [1]). Many animal
species live in groups and have to reach consensus in order to
maintain cohesion [5]. One of the most tractable ways of
understanding how group members attain consensus is to study
collective movements [6–9]. In this context, consensus decision-
making for group movements has been described as a continuum –
from an unshared consensus to an equally shared consensus [1,10].
The influence of ecological constraints has often been used to
explain the type of consensus observed [11,12]. Studies have
reported that specific individuals lead groups with the aim of
gaining better personal access to food (Papio ursinus [9]; Equus
burchellii [13]; Pan troglodytes [14]). In other studies, individuals who
know where to find the best food resources can become the leaders
[15]. These two general cases – leading according to needs or
according to knowledge - can be qualified as unshared or partially
shared consensus. On the other hand, shared consensus allows
information to be pooled and may lead to more appropriate
decisions for all group members [7,16].
Nevertheless, these previous studies did not explore the
influence that social network could have on the decision-making
process. This type of direct link between the properties of social
networks and the kind of consensus has been suggested [1,10,17],
but has never been empirically tested. Moreover, as stated in [18],
‘‘models of collective motion typically do not consider social
network structure’’, despite the fact that an increasing number of
studies illustrate how group social networks are both complex and
crucial for understanding the synchronisation of group activity.
Some authors have modelled the effect of social network on
collective motion in human crowds [19] and in fish shoals [20], but
their results were not compared to empirical data and the social
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observed in animal groups. Indeed, they used simple networks,
whereas Erdos-Renyi random networks or scale-free networks
were found in several animal species (see [17,21–24]). These social
networks described in animals may constrain many social
phenomena such as information or disease transmission, cooper-
ation and group fission in species ranging from amoebae to
primates [25–30]. The strength of the social relationships of group
members is not only based on ecological constraints but also on
species-specific and group-specific internal factors [31]. In the
genus Macaca [32] or Cebus [33], different social styles [34] have
been described, ranging from despotic to egalitarian societies [35].
Vehrencamp [36] first described these societies as follows:
‘‘Variation in the balance point between the forces of cooperation
and competition is common from society to society. In egalitarian
societies, benefits are divided roughly equally or in proportion to
the risk or effort taken. In despotic societies, on the other hand,
benefits accrue disproportionately to a few individuals in the group
at the expense of others. Societies can thus be ranked along a
continuum in terms of the degree to which fitnesses of individuals
within social groups are biased’’. This variation among social
networks can be observed through behavioural patterns that co-
vary [32]. In rhesus and Japanese macaques (Macaca mulatta and
M. fuscata), for example, most conflicts are unidirectional, high-
intensity aggression is common, and few conflicts are reconciled.
The dominant male appears to be very central, managing conflicts
and receiving the most grooming or other affiliative interactions
[21]. In Sulawesi macaques, most conflicts are bidirectional,
aggression is generally of low intensity, conciliatory tendencies are
frequent and grooming is distributed between all individuals rather
than centralized on the dominant male [31]. There is a recursive
feedback loop between the social network and individual
behaviour. Sueur and Petit [10] suggested a similar link between
social networks, - especially centrality - and consensus in their
studies on collective movements in macaques. An equally shared
consensus was found in the egalitarian Tonkean macaques (M.
tonkeana), whereas the more despotic rhesus macaques used a
partially shared consensus when deciding to move. In the same
way, it has previously been reported that species with strict
hierarchies appear to have unshared, or partially shared,
consensus (Canis lupus [37]; Helogale parvula [38]; Equus caballus
[39]; Gorilla gorilla berengei [40]).
Within many such societal organizations – despotic or
egalitarian - it is still not known how consensuses (reaching a
common decision in spite of conflicts of interest) emerge from then
influence properties of the social network. These networks,
despotic and egalitarian can be directly compared to centralized
and decentralized networks respectively [41]. Dominant or central
individuals are classically described as leaders but many factors
may constrain this leadership and we do not know if social
relationships really influence consensus, nor which of these
relationships (aggressive vs. affiliative for instance) influences the
consensus and to what extent it does so. Here, we based our study
on the assumption that the extent of affiliative relationships may
lead to a specific type of consensus, as the distribution of these
relationships seems to drive many other phenomena. However, to
test this assumption, we first need to combine an experimental
approach on several groups with modelling, and then have to
combine social network analysis with models for collective motion.
We first created artificial social networks – representing the
continuum from centralized to decentralized organization – and
then developed a stochastic model to make predictions about the
patterns of collective movements that would emerge from them.
Who leads? And who is more successfully followed, both in terms
of the number of followers and of the time needed for a follower to
join the movement? We predict that the more centralized the
network is, the more differences will appear between individuals,
with the emergence of a leader during collective movements. And
if it has a central position in the network, this leader will increase
both the number of joiners and the joining speed of individuals.
We then compared the relations between social network and
patterns of collective movements to linear and non-linear functions
in order to establish how leadership emerges from the social
network. Indeed, many studies have already shown that the
relation between the information transfer and the probability of
performing a behaviour does not increase linearly but in a non-
linear way due to an amplification process [42–44]. In order to
validate or nullify our assumptions based on simulations, the
theoretical data was therefore compared to observed data collected
from the observation of collective movements in five different
groups of primates living in similar semi free-ranging conditions.
Methods
Ethics Statement
This study involved the observation of animals without animal
handling or invasive experiments carried out on studied subjects.
We declare that our study was carried out in full accordance with
the ethical guidelines of our institution with the approval of the
latter (certificate number: 67-339, French Republic, Bas-Rhin
County Hall, French veterinary services). Our experiments comply
with European animal welfare legislation. The work being carried
out during this study is in accordance with the weatherall report
and all efforts were made to ensure the welfare of the animals and
minimize suffering. Concerning the amelioration of animal
welfare, the study groups were bred under semi free-ranging
conditions at the Strasbourg University Centre of Primatology.
They had complete access to about 0.35 ha (maximal
length=80 m; maximal width=60 m) of wooded parkland as
well as indoor housing within the enclosure. The indoor housing
(20 m
2) is made of cement and tiling. The enclosure area was
made up of various slopes and uneven ground. The distribution of
vegetation was also heterogeneous, with three layers (grass, trees
and bushes) that were unevenly distributed throughout the
enclosure. For each group, fresh fruit and vegetables were
provided once a week, one hour after the end of the observation
session. Thus, the behaviour of the animals was unlikely to be
affected by this event. Animals were used to human presence in
their enclosure.
Modelling
The model is based on rules of mimetism/cohesion (Markov
chain process) described in several studies on collective phenom-
ena [42–44]. In this model, the probability that an individual will
join the collective movement depends on the number but also the
strength of relationships it has with the individuals already
participating in the movement. The number of individuals,
individual identities and the network of affiliative relationships of
each artificial social network are included in the model. At the
start of a simulation, all agents (N) were in an area called the
resting area and had to move to another area, the foraging area.
We implemented the intrinsic probability li of each agent. This
intrinsic probability is independent of the influence of conspecifics,
and is, for example, a nutrient need. The departure probability of
the initiator (first individual to depart) was the same whatever the
social network and identity of this individual and was constant per
time unit. The departure probability y01 of the initiator was:
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i~1
li ð1Þ
The probability yi of an individual i becoming a joiner j was:
yi~lizM
X N
k~1
r(i,k) ð2Þ
where li is the intrinsic probability of each agent (li=0.00007), M
is the mimetic coefficient (M=0.002), and r(i,k) is the affiliative
relationships between the resting individual i and the already
moving individual k.I fk was not moving, r(i,k)=0. Values of r(i,k)
are given in the section ‘‘artificial social networks’’. According to
the values of li and M, yi,1.
We implemented the model and each artificial social network in
Netlogo 3.1.4 [45,46]. At each time step (corresponding to
1 second in the real system), a number between 0 and 1 was
randomly attributed to each resting agent (i.e. in the resting area);
when this number was lower than the theoretical departure
probability of each agent, the individual left the resting area for the
foraging area; if this number was higher than the theoretical
departure probability, the agent did not move. To be consistent
with observed data [3,8,47–51], we stopped a simulation when no
agent joined within 300 s of the departure of the initiator or the
last joiner. We set the number of simulations at 10,000 for each
social network.
Artificial social networks
A group can be defined as a network in which each dyad of
individuals is characterized by one or several types of social bonds
such as hierarchical, kin or affiliative ones [52,53]. In this study, in
order to gain insight into the generic properties of how social
relationships result in consensus decision-making, we designed a
deliberately simplified social structure, and thus only investigated
affiliative relationships related to movement decisions. We created
artificial networks consisting of 10 individuals (N=10), this group
size being close to that of the five observed primate groups. Links,
i.e. affiliative relationships, can be calculated by scoring proxim-
ities, contacts, or grooming duration between individuals [25,54].
Each individual i has a fixed quantity of social interactions
(Sr(i,k)=1) that it can divide between its conspecifics. Indeed,
several studies have showed that social interactions are time-
constrained and seemed to be maintained at a certain value,
whatever the group size or the environmental pressures [26,55].
Each individual k will receive an amount of social interactions r(i,k)
from the individual i. As the main topic of our study is based on
the impact of the central individual (i.e. the strength of centrality)
on collective decision-making, we studied how the relationships
between all non central individuals c and the central individual C
influenced the patterns of decision-making during collective
movements, i.e., who is the most successful individual in terms
of number of followers and how rapidly followers join the
movement. For each social network included in this study, the
central individual will be considered the individual having
the most numerous and strongest relationships (based on the
eigenvector coefficient). This study aimed to observe different
patterns of collective decision-making according to the distribution
of relationships within the group. Each individual has one social
relationship r(i,k) with each of the N21 other group members. We
defined (1) r(i,k)=r(c,C), the relationship that a non central
individual c had with the central individual C; (2) r(i,k)=r(c,c), the
relationship that a non central individual c had with any other non
central individual c (for each network, all r(c,c) are equal); and (3)
r(i,k)=r(C,c), the relationship that the central individual C had with
any non central individual c. We created different social networks,
from extremely centralized to extremely decentralized, by varying
the relationship that an individual i had with a congener k and
especially the relationships that non central individuals c had with
the central individual C. For instance, we attributed to r(c,C) a
value equal to 1 for the extremely centralized system (called the star
network) and equal to 1/(N21) for the extremely decentralized
system (called the equal network) ([41,54]). Whatever the network,
however, r(C,c), the value of interaction attributed by the central
individual C to each non central individual c, equalled 1/(N21).
We eventually created six different social networks where r(c,C)
and then r(c,c) differed (see Table 1 for detailed values of each
network and Fig. 1A–C for network representations). As all
r(i,k)=1 and then Sr(i,k)=9 for each network, we can compare all
networks together in analyses. We also built a random network
(Erdos-Renyi graph), which was obtained using Ucinet 6.0 [56]
and a chain network. Random network is found in several primate
species [23,57] but the chain network is a hierarchical network
only found in human beings and more specifically in military
departments or in firms [41,53]. Graphs of these networks are
given in supplementary material (Fig. S1), and their indices can be
found in Table S1.
According to equation 2 of our model, the more a resting agent
had strongly affiliated moving agents, the greater its probability of
joining was. Thus, the more a moving agent had strongly affiliated
resting agents, the greater its probability of being joined was. This
means that in the equal network, the probability of joining the
movement would only depend on the number of agents already
moving, whatever their identities. Conversely, in the star network,a s
r(c,C).r(C,c), the central individual C would have more probability
of being joined than any non central individual c.
Empirical data
In order to validate our theoretical results, we compared them
to observed data. We used affiliative relationships (based on body
contacts or proximities between individuals) in relation to
movements and collective decision-making patterns during the
collective movements of five different groups of primates living in
similar semi free-ranging conditions. Data were obtained from two
groups of Tonkean macaques [3,8,17,50,51], one group of rhesus
macaques [3,8,17,50,51], one group of brown lemurs (Lemur
macaco, [47,58]) and one group of white-faced capuchin monkeys
(Cebus capucinus, [33,48,49]). All authors used similar data scoring
and similar definitions for collective movements and affiliative
relationships, minimizing the risk of methodological bias in the
comparisons.
As the distribution of the first departure latencies (time between
the end of the previous collective movement and the departure of
the initiator of the new collective movement [3,47,49]) corre-
sponded to an exponential distribution in the observed groups
[3,47,49], we used the mean log gradient of this exponential
distribution, that is, the inverse of the mean departure latency of
the initiator [3,43,43,47,49], to calculate the departure probability
y01 of the initiator. y01=0.0007 for any initiator of any social
network.
Then in our model, given that y01=0.0007 per s and
n=N=10, the probability per individual of departing first is
li=0.00007 per s. In our case, the probabilities were identical
with l1=…=ln=l, meaning that all individuals had the same
intrinsic probability.
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(time between the departure of the previous joiner j21 and the
departure of the joiner j) of each observed group fitted a parabolic
curve [3,43,43,47,49], we could implement a mimetic process (i.e.
M) in our model, representing an amplification of the probability
of joining a movement with the number of individuals already
participating in this movement. The calculation of the mean
mimetic coefficient M was based on that found in five primate
groups and this coefficient equals 0.002.
Data scoring and calculation
Indices of social networks. Affiliative relationships among
observed groups were determined using proximities/contacts
between individuals [3,17,33,47–50,58]. We determined the
eigenvector centrality coefficient for each individual in each artificial
social network and each observed group (i.e. real group). This
index takes into account the number and the strength of
relationships between an individual and its conspecifics, as well
as the relationships its associated individuals have with other group
members. On the contrary, indices such as the clustering
coefficient or the betweenness coefficient do not take into
account the strength of relationships but only their number [52].
For the equal network, all eigenvector centrality coefficients were
equal whatever the individual identities (see Table 1 for details). In
the star network and the three different centralized networks, the
coefficients of non central individuals c are equal to one another
but smaller than that of the central individual C. We then
calculated the difference between the eigenvector centrality
coefficient of the central individual C and the mean eigenvector
centrality coefficient of all non central individuals c. This index,
which we called the centrality index, allowed us to quantify the
degree of centrality or centralization [59] of a social network – the
group – and to compare the artificial social networks with the
observed groups [32]. Indeed, this index allows us to quantify the
difference of centralities between the central individual and the
other individuals in the group. This index ranged from 0 – in a
decentralized network where all individuals have the same
relationships – to 1 in a centralized network where group
members only have social relationships with the central
individuals. In this study, the centrality index varied from 0 for the
equal network to 0.85 for the star network (see Table 1 for details).
Data about collective movements. The number of joiners
was scored for each collective movement. We also scored the
identity and the departure latency of the initiator (DT01) and of
every joiner (DTj21,j). We calculated the rank of each agent during
the joining process, regardless of its identity. The rank of the
initiator was rank 1, the rank of the first joiner was rank 2, and the
rank of the j
th joiner was rank j+1. Departure latency of the
initiator DT01 was calculated by scoring the time elapsed between
the start of the simulation and the departure of this individual. We
then scored the departure latency of each joiner, that is, the
departure latency of the joiner j, DTj21,j, corresponding to the time
elapsed between the departure of the joiner j21 (i.e. the previous
departing individual, including the initiator) and the departure of
the joiner j. Finally, we scored the duration of joining DT1,10 as the
time elapsed between the departure of the initiator and the
departure of the last joiner only when all individuals (N=10)
joined the movement.
For (1) the number of joiners n, (2) the departure latency of the
first joiner DT1,2, and (3) the duration of joining DT1,10,w e
calculated the average xC,c1{c9 for all individuals, the average xC
for the central individual C, and the average xc1{c9for the non
central individuals c, when these individuals initiated movements.
These were the main three variables for our analysis. For each of
Figure 1. Graph representation of social networks. (a) Star network (extremely centralized), (b) centralized networks (highly, intermediately,
and low), and (c) equal network (extremely decentralized). Squares represent individuals. C is the central individual, c1–9 are non central individuals.
Lines are relationships between individuals: the thicker the line, the stronger the relationship. The size of square represents the eigenvector centrality:
the bigger the square, the higher the centrality.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032566.g001
Table 1. Relationships, eigenvector centrality for the central individual C and the non central individuals c, and centrality index for
each social network.
Network r(c, C) r(c, c) r(C, c) Eigenvector of C Eigenvector of c Centrality index
Star 1 0 1/(n–1) 0.95 0.1 0.85
Highly centralized 0.75 0.25/(n–2) 1/(n–1) 0.91 0.14 0.77
Intermediately
centralized
0.50 0.50/(n–2) 1/(n–1) 0.83 0.18 0.65
Low centralized 0.25 0.75/(n–2) 1/(n–1) 0.6 0.27 0.33
Very low centralized 0.125 0.875/(n-2) 1/(n-1) 0.36 0.31 0.05
Equal 1/(n–1) 1/(n–1) 1/(n–1) 0.32 0.32 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032566.t001
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between the central individual C and the non central individuals c,
xC{xc1{c9. We also assessed whether or not the number of
joiners was different when the central individual C was the first
joiner.
Statistical analyses
Data on random network and chain network were only included
in Global analyses in order to avoid any interference with our main
aim, which was to understand the relationship between social
networks and collective decision-making by studying the role of the
central individual.
Global analyses: We first analysed the possible link between the
centrality index and the average xC,c1{c9of the three main variables:
the mean number of joiners nC,c1{c9, the mean departure latency
of the first joiner DT1,2C,c1{c9, and the mean duration of joining
DT1,10C,c1{c9, using curve estimation tests. The curve estimation
test determined the best relation [60,61] between two variables
(linear, exponential and logarithmic) to understand if the
leadership emerges in a linear or non-linear way from the
properties of the social networks. We assessed whether differences
exist between each artificial social network using a Kruskal-Wallis
test followed by a Dunn’s multiple comparisons test. We also
compared the departure latency distribution of each social
network using Spearman rank correlation tests. The initiator’s
latencies were not included in this test because, as explained
above, the departure probability of this individual was identical
whatever the social network.
Differences between the central and non central individuals: We first
analysed how the difference xC{xc1{c9 varied according to the
social network for the three variables (i.e. nC{nc1{c9;
DT1,2C{DT1,2c1{c9; DT1,10C{DT1,10c1{c9) using curve estima-
tion tests. Next we assessed whether the three variables
(n,DT1,2,DT1,10) were different between the central individual C
and the non central individuals c using Mann-Whitney tests
(number of data equals 10,000 for each condition). We then
determined whether or not a difference in the number of joiners
existed when the central individual C was the first joiner for each
social network (using a Mann-Whitney test). Finally, departure
latency distribution of the central individual C was compared with
those of the non central individuals c in each social network using a
Spearman rank correlation test.
Comparisons of theoretical and observed data. The
values obtained for the three main variables in the simulations
were compared with those observed in the five primate groups.
Using a linear curve estimation test, we assessed for similar centrality
indices whether we obtained a correlation between the simulated
data and the observed data for the differences nC{nc1{c9,
DT1,2C{DT1,2c1{c9, and DT1,10C{DT1,10c1{c9.
We carried out the statistical tests in SPSS 10.0; a=0.05.
Means are 6 SE (standard error).
Results
1) Global analyses
These global analyses will highlight differences in decision-
making between the different social networks tested.
Mean number of joiners. We investigated the relation
between the mean number of joiners nC,c1{c9and social network
type (from centralized to decentralized). The test revealed that the
curve best followed an exponential inverse law (R
2=0.81,
F1,4=17.02, p=0.015; y=0.0263e
4.6039(x-9)) and Figure 2A
suggested a sudden decrease for high decentralized indices. The
mean numbers of joiners of the star and highly decentralized networks
Figure 2. Relation between the centrality index and variables
of collective decisions (movements). (a) Mean number of joiners,
(b) mean departure latency of the first joiner, and (c) mean duration of
joining whatever the initiator’s identity. The relation between the
centrality index and the mean duration of joiners follows an exponential
law. The relation between the centrality index and the mean departure
latency of the first joiner does not follow any tested law. The relation
between the centrality index and the mean duration of joining follows
an exponential law. Parameters of functions are given in the global
analyses section of Results. For each network, error bars are indicated
and represent the standard error. R indicates the result for random
network and C indicates the result for chain networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032566.g002
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df=7, p=0.0001; Dunn’s test: p,0.0001, see Table S2 in the
supplementary material for details). However, the number of
joiners in the chain network was higher than that observed in other
networks.
Mean departure latency of the first joiner. The mean
departure latency of the first joiner DT1,2C,c1{c9 increased with the
centrality index in an exponential way (R
2=0.82, F1,4=18.09,
p=0.013, y=48.37e
0.81x; Fig. 2B). Indeed, this departure latency
was higher for the star and the highly centralized networks than for all
other networks (K-W: H=239.6, df=7, p=0.0001; Dunn’s
multiple comparisons test: p,0.0001).
Mean duration of joining. The mean duration of joining
DT1,10C,c1{c9 did not varied according to the type of social
network (R
2,0.14, F1,4=0.64, p.0.466, Fig. 2C). However, the
mean duration of joining was higher for the chain and highly
centralized networks than for the other networks (K-W: H=234.2,
df=7, p=0.0001; Dunn’s multiple comparisons test: p,0.01).
Latency distributions. We assessed whether the joining of
each individual to the movement differs according to the social
network. We studied latency distribution according to rank of
joining and then compared the distributions of each network. The
latency distribution in the star network was not correlated with the
distributions found in the other networks (star network vs. other
networks: rs ,0.28, N=9, p.0.058) whilst all other networks
were correlated with each other (other networks between them: rs
.0.83, N=9, p,0.005; see Fig. S2 in the supplementary material
information).
2) Differences between the central individual and the
non central ones
These analyses assessed how the probabilities of joining the
movement, and thus the speed of decision-making and the number
of joiners, are affected by the identity of the initiator.
Mean number of joiners. We first checked how the
differencenC{nc1{c9 varied according to social network. The
curve considered followed an exponential law (R
2=0.77,
F1,4=10.41, p=0.03, y=0.003e
7.75x). The higher the centrality
index of the initiator was, the higher the difference in the number of
joiners between the central individual C and the non central
individuals c was. This result was confirmed by Mann-Whitney
tests which showed that the difference in the mean number of
joiners between the central individual C and the non central
individuals c was only significant for the star (Z=227.17,
p,0.0001, nC =9.99, nc1{c9 =5.1), high centralized (Z=211.22,
p,0.0001, nC =9.99, nc1{c9 =8.89), and intermediately centralized
(Z=23.7, p=0.0002, nC =9.99, nc1{c9 =9.79) networks. The
number of joiners decreased with the centrality index when non
central individuals were initiators (Fig. 3A).
In the same way, when the central individual C was the first
joiner, this increased the number of individuals joining a
movement for the star (Z=27.3, p,0.0001, nC =9.99,
nc1{c9 =8.15) and highly centralized (Z=22.2, p=0.028, nC =10,
nc1{c9 =9.8) networks. There was no such increase for the
remaining networks because movements initiated by non central
individuals c already had approximately 10 joiners, even if the first
joiner was not the central individual C.
Mean departure latency of the first joiner. The curve
estimation test showed that the difference DT1,2C{DT1,2c1{c9
varied according to a linear law with the centrality index (R
2=0.93,
F1,4=51.11, p=0.002, y=19.293x+0.6889). This difference was
significant for the star (Z=232.9, p,0.0001, DT1,2C =6.75,
DT1,2c1{c9 =137.22), highly centralized (Z=229.3, p,0.0001,
DT1,2C =7.35, DT1,2c1{c9 =99.4), intermediately centralized
(Z=229.7, p,0.0001, DT1,2C =11.6, DT1,2c1{c9 =75.5), low
centralized (Z=217, p,0.0001, DT1,2C =22.9, DT1,2c1{c957.3)
and very low centralized (Z=27.5, p,0.0001, DT1,2C =40.5,
DT1,2c1{c9 =54.24) networks. The departure latency of the first
joiner decreased with the centrality index when the central individual
C initiated the movement, whilst it increased when a non central
individual c initiated it (Fig. 3B).
Mean duration of joining. The difference DT1,10C{
DT1,10c1{c9 increased with the centrality index according to a
linear curve (R
2=0.92, F1,4=46.14, p=0.002). This difference
was statistically significant for non-equal networks (Z,214.7,
p,0.0001 for all networks; star: DT1,10C =154.4, DT1,10c1{c9 =
290.5; highly centralized: DT1,10C =152.2, DT1,10c1{c9 =322.4;
intermediately centralized: DT1,10C =174.7, DT1,10c1{c9300.9, low
centralized: DT1,10C =203.3, DT1,10c1{c9261.6, very low centralized:
DT1,10C =228.5, DT1,10c1{c9 =261.3). The mean duration of
joining greatly decreased with the centrality index when the central
individual C initiated movements (Fig. 3C).
Latency distributions. For each social network, we assessed
whether latency distribution differed according to whether
movements were initiated by the central individual C or the non
central individuals c. On the one hand, the two latency
distributions were correlated for the low centralized (rs=0.73,
N=9, p=0.02), very low centralized (rs=0.95, N=9, p,0.0001) and
equal (rs=0.99, N=9, p,0.0001) networks (Fig. S3); the response
and the probability of joiners were similar for these three networks,
whatever the initiator’s identity. On the other hand, they were not
correlated for the star (rs=0.3, N=9, p=0.432), highly centralized
(rs=20.31, N=9, p=0.406), or intermediately centralized
(rs=20.13, N=9, p=0.732) networks (Fig. S3).
3) Comparisons between the artificial and observed
social networks
These comparisons with observed decision-making in natural
primate groups were conducted in order to validate our theoretical
results.
Mean number of joiners. We determined whether for
similar centrality indices we obtained a correlation between the
simulated data and the observed ones for the difference
nC{nc1{c9. The two variables were correlated (R
2=0.83,
F1,3=57.6, p=0.03). We obtained the same relation between
the number of joiners and the centrality index for theoretical and
observed data. The difference between the central individual C
and the non central individuals c was, however, about 100-fold
higher in the observed data compared to theoretical data.
Mean departure latency of the first joiner. Contrary to
results above, there was no correlation between observed and
theoretical data for the difference DT1,2C{DT1,2c1{c9 (R
2=0.04,
F1,3=0.124, p=0.747)
Mean duration of joining. The results showed a correlation
for the difference DT1,10C{DT1,10c1{c9 (R
2=0.95, F1,3=15.3,
p=0.003). We obtained the same relation between the mean
duration of joining and the centrality index in theoretical and
observed data.
Discussion
For a long time, scientists have tried to understand the origins of
leadership in non-human primates and humans [1,4,7,62]. In this
study, we assessed how social networks from centralized to
decentralized can affect collective decisions and specifically the
emergence of this leadership. By analysing patterns of collective
decision-making such as joining speed, we aimed to determine
whether animals gain an advantage - in terms of saving time or
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Our results showed that different social networks, and especially
opposite ones – star vs. equal network - led to very different
patterns. From a star network to an equal one, the central
individual lost its leadership; it had less impact on the joining and
then on the decision-making process. This theoretical result was
Figure 3. Comparison between the central individual and the non central individuals. (a) Mean number of joiners, (b) mean departure
latency of the first joiner, and (c) mean joining duration for each social network. Central individual is represented by the black bars, non central
individuals are represented by the white bars.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032566.g003
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and did not include other relationships, such as aggressive and
submissive behaviours. This means that a unique leader may
emerge without the use of dominance and/or coercion of the
dominant individual on subordinate ones. A simple rule based on
social network properties allowed us to explain leadership and
organizations of group members during movements. We therefore
showed a non-linear link between the type of social network and
the resulting consensus. The decision-making system switched
from an unshared consensus to a shared consensus when the social
network switched from a centralized to a decentralized one. By
comparing our theoretical data with observed ones, we confirmed
that this relationship also seems to exist in groups of primates. The
question may appear trivial but this link between social structure
and consensus had never been directly demonstrated before this
study. Several studies have already attempted to explain the
relation between social network and collective decision-making,
but tested this link either theoretically or empirically in only one
species or genus [3,47,45]. This study is the first to combine
different approaches and to confirm an influence of social network
on collective decision-making in a wide range of primate species.
These results illustrate that social networks have a great influence
on the emergence of leadership and that ecological factors alone
cannot explain all the patterns of collective decision-making. This
study provides new elements that could help to disentangle
contradictory results found on these two hot topics in previous
studies [1,3,12,63,64]. The centrality index is also a new index that
can be useful to qualify the level of centralization of a group [32].
The relative importance of affiliative interactions (grooming,
contacts) and spatial associations (proximities) is difficult to
disentangle, reflecting the fact they are highly correlated in
primate societies. In this study, we may wonder whether the
emergence of leadership and the type of consensus depend directly
on the network or depend more on the spatial distribution of
individuals, the decision resulting from a spatial diffusion.
However, in the model used in this study, we did not implement
the spatial distribution of individuals (they all started from the
same point). Moreover, in a study where both spatial and
grooming interactions influence the organization and order of
group members at departures of collective movements, authors
suggested that the influence of grooming was not an artifact of its
relationship to spatial association but that individuals do follow
‘friends’ (according to the affiliative relationship), but preferentially
those friends that are in closest proximity (according to the spatial
distribution depending on the affiliative relationships) [45].
The influence of social networks on collective phenomena has
already been described for information or disease transmission
[65,66]. Such authors such as Watts [67,68] or Fowler [69]
already studied the effect of connectivity of networks on the
‘cascade’ propagation on behaviours such as innovations or
decisions. Voelkl and Noe ¨ [54] used several artificial networks
implemented in a multi-agent system to test the influence of social
structure on the propagation of social information. They then
compared their results with data based on one primate group. In
these studies on information transmission, the central individual
was then a key element for a higher or lower transmission.
Likewise, Sueur and Petit [10,17] highlighted the fact that the
social styles of macaque species influenced how they decided
collectively but without directly testing the effect of social network
for the different groups. In rhesus macaques, known as a despotic
species [31], dominant individuals who are more central increased
the probability of other group members joining a movement,
whereas in the tolerant Tonkean macaques, each group member
had the same weight in the decision-making process [3,10,17].
Our theoretical study showed similar results but also that contacts
or grooming between individuals can suffice to explain leadership
distribution, without any need to take the dominance rank of
individuals, their level of aggression or other individual charac-
teristics into account. In a centralized network, the central
individual had more joiners and shorter joining latencies than
non central individuals did. This result seem to confirm some
studies reporting that the dominance individuals, who are often
the central ones, were leaders (Canis lupus [37]; Helogale parvula [38];
Equus caballu [39]; Gorilla gorilla berengei [40]). On the contrary, in a
decentralized, but also in centralized networks with links between
non central individuals, there was no difference in patterns (speed
of joining and number of joiners) whatever the centrality of the
initiator. In this study, we tested the effect of centrality, especially
the eigenvector coefficient, on the consensus type. This eigenvec-
tor coefficient was also the most common coefficient used to test
how information or disease spreads in a group. However, Kitsak
et al. [70] theoretically showed that the most efficient individuals
allowing the diffusion of information were not always those who
were the most connected or had the highest eigenvector centrality
coefficient. They found that the most efficient ‘spreaders’ were
those located within the core of the network, that is to say the
individuals with the highest betweenness coefficient [52,71]. It
should therefore be interesting to study this kind of networks to
assess how sub-grouping patterns and betweenness centrality could
affect collective decision-making as we did here with the
eigenvector centrality.
Recent studies have suggested the existence of unshared
consensus in animal groups [72,73]. This consensus would allow
the dominant individual to have better access to food or to satisfy
its own needs [11]. In other species, individuals who have the best
information for foraging or another activity would also lead the
group, whatever their social status. We also showed in this study
that an unshared consensus, through the social position of
individuals in the network, led to a quicker decision. Nevertheless,
Conradt and Roper [1] stipulated that an unshared consensus
could lead to high costs for group members because they cannot
satisfy their own needs, unlike the leader. This dissatisfaction may
drive the group to split, removing all interest for the leader to
continue leading the group. We might oppose this to shared
consensus, through which all individuals decide to move and can
then meet their individual needs. The shared distribution of
initiations between all group members also leads to a decrease in
the probability of making a mistake regarding the chosen location.
Indeed, in the case of a shared decision, information is shared and
pooled, which is not the case in unshared consensus [16,62]. Thus,
both kinds of consensus seem to have advantages: speed for an
unshared decision versus accuracy for a shared decision. This
speed-accuracy trade-off paradigm is well known [74], but to the
best of our knowledge, no study has yet attempted to assess
whether the social network of a group can affect this trade-off, and
therefore also affect the efficiency of a collective decision [2,29].
Interestingly, we showed that the link between social network
and consensus was, however, not linear. Indeed, the relations
between the centrality index and the dependent variables follow
non-linear functions. The functions we found showed that there
was a threshold (about 0.8) where the decision-making system
switched from an unshared to a shared consensus. As soon as non
central individuals interacted with each other, the consensus
turned into a shared consensus. Indeed, the affiliative relationships
between all group members seem to play an important role in the
decision-making process. The decision-making system appears to
be highly non-linear, evolving more rapidly into a mimetic, and
especially allelomimetic process (decentralized) than a leadership
From Social Network to Collective Decision
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believed that group members decided to join a movement due
to the leader’s departure. However, current results show that
animals decide to join a movement according to the number and
the identities of all already moving agents, and not only according
to the initiator [75].
The present study showed that individuals only took their
affiliative relationships into account for moving, and gave
particular importance to the strongest relationships. Our model
suggested that group members might solely consider local
interactions. The central individual had an important role in the
decision-making process, but based on simple rules dependant on
the network, and especially in this study, on affiliative relation-
ships. Other social interactions, positive or negative, requiring
more or less cognitive abilities, did not need to be implemented in
our model to understand the emergence of leadership. Authors
have suggested that the complexity of collective movement
observed in primates – with specific order and associations of
individuals – could only emerge thanks to developed cognitive
abilities which enable primates to use intentions, manipulations,
and insights [12,14,76]. Complex phenomena can, however,
emerge from simple and local interactions [75]. Hemelrijk [77,78]
showed that the complex spatial positions and associations of
macaques – with dominant individuals at the middle of the group
and subordinate ones at the periphery – could emerge from simple
rules based on how individuals behave after conflicts (staying in the
same place or moving away from the winner). Hemelrijk’s model,
like ours, did not take into account the intentions or cognitive
abilities of primates, but successfully reproduced the patterns of the
collective phenomena in question.
Our study is a starting point for the investigation of how social
networks and consensus are interrelated. Theoretical results were
confirmed by observed data in several groups of primates. The five
study groups living in semi free-ranging conditions highlighted the
importance of the social network rather than the equally important
question of ecological pressures. It would be interesting as a second
step to recreate the natural environment of animals in order to
assess how ecology and social network interact together to
constrain consensus decisions. How social network influences
decisions is a crucial question and answering this question may
have direct applications as management and conservation of
animal populations [79,80] or in firm management and Econom-
ics [81].
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